The Evolution of Great Power Influence in the Western Balkans

On 21 September 2023, the Hungarian Institute of International Affairs (HIIA) held a roundtable discussion entitled “The Evolution of Great Power Influence in the Western Balkans”, with the participation of András Deák, Senior Research Fellow at the Institute for Strategic and Defense Studies, Sayfo Omar, Senior Researcher at the Migration Research Institute, and HIIA team members Cintia Viola, Research Fellow and Tamás Péter Baranyi, Director of Strategy. The discussion was moderated by Julianna Ármás, Research Fellow at the Hungarian Institute of International Affairs.

The context of the Balkan great power rivalry was established by Cintia Viola at the beginning of the discussion; the Balkans as a fragmented geographical entity gives room for political-economic-geographical diversification, thus facilitating the ambitions of external powers. The region can be seen as a space of imperial transition, where historically there has been a strong Central European, Black Sea and Mediterranean branch of influence, complemented by Middle Eastern aspirations from the Southeast. Omar Sayfo pointed out at the very start that the Middle East’s links to the Balkans are primarily the local Muslim communities, a connection that was strengthened in the civil wars of the 1990s by Türkiye or other countries in the region providing economic assistance for reconstruction through existing religious networks. He prefaced by saying that this nexus poses a different kind of risk in the Balkan geopolitical space, but it is also true that there is less Eastern influence than is perceived.

It is undeniable that the narrative of great power rivalry is relevant in many parts of the world, so the question was rather how important the Western Balkans is for great powers even after the 1990s, when the region was important in its own right. Omar Sayfo said that investors and prominent groups in the Gulf Countries are using their presence in the Western Balkans more for their own domestic political rivalries, to make political capital “at home.” This is why Saudi Arabia and Qatar – the two most ambitious Arab states in the Balkans – do not coordinate their activities, because what matters is that they invest in a foreign country. He added that religion is no longer the main driver of the Middle East’s presence: it is rather the building of economic bridges, a good example being that Serbia is the UAE’s most important economic partner in the region. Tamás Baranyi then turned to the presence of the US, pointing out that the post-war settlement in the Balkans was conceived by the US, and therefore a regional unipolar model emerged from the then global unipolar order. Like Bosnia and Herzegovina, independent Kosovo can be seen as a diplomatic victory for the US, but maintaining the United States’ influence is inevitable for their stability. In conclusion, the Western Balkans is necessary for the legitimacy of the United States as a great power.

However, the Balkans being a marginal region in the strategy of the great powers does not mean that they are not present in the region. András Deák noted that Russia is not economically strong in the Balkans, its influence is insignificant except in the energy sector; and since the Balkan countries’ energy production is largely based on coal and water, Russia is only relatively strong in the energy sector. Although they have a significant presence at the identification level of influence-building activity, with a stable and strong Russian image, especially in Serbia. In contrast to the Russian presence, the influence in the Middle East, as already mentioned, is rather significant at the economic level, and the Gulf States cannot compete with Türkiye on identity issues. Cultural differences also have an impact on the economy, Omar Sayfo pointed out, as the culture of doing business is very different – which is why economic relations only take off when there is a state support behind them. Tamás Baranyi, continuing the earlier line of thought, distinguished three levels of the current US presence in the Western Balkans. Firstly, the institutional influence of the US is strong, secondly, its economic presence is not negligible, especially in strategically important sectors, and thirdly, the geopolitical level can be highlighted after the mid-2010s and the emergence of China.

To conclude the discussion, the panellists responded to the question of which power centre should be the place of the Balkans, being a region which is fragmented at various levels but on the path to EU integration. Omar Sayfo briefly summarised that Arab countries cannot put pressure on the countries of the region, and that it is rather advantageous for them as well if Balkan countries become EU members, as they are seen as the gateway to the EU. In his reply, András Deák pointed out that the EU is the source of most imports and aid, and that a large part of exports from the Balkans are directed to the EU, but that despite this, the Western Balkan countries have not received much in return, apart from the promise of accession. The question is how long a multidimensional foreign policy can be maintained in a fragmented space of great powers, which also contributes to internal political divisions. Yet all the states in the region prefer to opt for the vague promises of integration, seeing the prospect of economic development only in the EU, which also guarantees stability.