The Ukrainian Prosperity Roadmap and the Road to Nowhere
Perspective – Written by Philip Pilkington
The full analysis is available here.
In late January, Politico reported that it had received a document outlining a “Prosperity Roadmap” for Ukraine after the war. The document showed that the “US and the EU are hoping to attract $800 billion of public and private funds to help rebuild Ukraine.” Yet it was not attributable to any official government body, and its source remains a mystery. Politico did report that the “European Commission circulated the plans with EU capitals” ahead of a leader’s summit where the document was “addressed.” What this means is unclear because Politico’s sources remained anonymous.
The document itself is as unusual as the reporting on it. It reads far more like a private consultancy report that is part of an investment pitch deck than it does a public policy document. Public policy documents, especially those that lay out economic plans, are formulated in such a way that various strategies—say, changes to investment or taxation policy—are argued for in line with evidence that is clearly laid out. The “Prosperity Roadmap” instead effectively asserts what will happen to the postwar economy and then pitches the reader on a variety of potential investments. A clue to why the document reads like a pitch deck might be found in the Politico article, in which Philipp Hildebrand, the investment firm BlackRock’s vice chairman, is quoted extensively.
Perhaps it is best to read the Prosperity Roadmap document as an investment pitch being put forward by those who have a stake—whether political or financial—in the reconstruction of Ukraine. The only question then is who the potential investor might be. On this the document is vague—it states that the capital is “expected to come from a range of public and private sources.” But if we read between the lines it seems like the idea is to try to coax reconstruction funds out of the European Commission and then leverage these funds to attract private sector capital. The document suggests two instruments to achieve this. The first are “non-recoverable grants”—that is, money provided by EU taxpayers. The second are “recoverable financial instruments with sub-market returns”—that is, private investment that will not be profitable at market rates and so will be financed by the money provided by EU taxpayers. The document states that together these will “mobilize at least $500bn of public and private capital.”
There is little point in trying to evaluate the suggested investments. They are vague. The “Ukraine Investment Framework” that is currently the largest support mechanism for investments into Ukraine will target “priority growth sectors and critical, social, and strategic infrastructure aligned with Ukraine’s reconstruction and EU integration objectives.” We are not told which sectors will be targeted, how much money will be deployed, or what criteria will be used to judge the investments. The “Human Capital and Return Support Fund,” which the report suggests should be created, will channel “grants and sub-market return-seeking capital, in coordination with existing channels, to rebuilding basic infrastructure, under a joint effort to redevelop areas impacted by the war to restore, redevelop, and modernize cities, residential areas, and basic infrastructure.” That is all we are told about a fund that will deploy billions of taxpayer euros to rebuild the infrastructure of a major European country.
The document then goes on to lay out the basic criteria that the Ukrainian government will have to meet to get access to the funds. These include having a “stable, functioning democracy with accountable leadership” and “macroeconomic stability anchored by a strong central bank and a modern, transparent, digital-native financial system” among others. We are not told under what circumstances the funds will be withheld. For example, who will determine whether Ukraine is sufficiently democratic to receive the funds? The European Commission, perhaps? But if so, what will happen to any private sector partners that are already invested in a given project? Will they get a say? We are not told. Once again, this is not really an investment plan—it is better read as an investment pitch. The language used is not the language of the lawyer or the regulator—it is the language of the investment salesperson.
In another section, we are presented with a “100-Day Operational Plan.” The “plan” is divided into five “workstreams” described in less than three pages. In the first “workstream,” for example, we are advised that a “prosperity adviser” should be appointed to “catalyze maximum opportunity for future prosperity.” Capital will be efficiently deployed by “keep track of key KPIs.” A task force will be established to “build a communication plan for ‘Vision 2040.’” None of this is remotely serious. This is a very vague blueprint for establishing an investment team, not a blueprint for the reconstruction of a country like Ukraine. It is impossible to read a document like this and seriously think that the people that produced it should be handed hundreds of billions of euros of taxpayers’ money. The document is simply not fit for prime time. It should never have been circulated among lawmakers. The fact that it has been calls into question the seriousness of the bureaucrats and the politicians in Brussels.
Perhaps the most bizarre part of the document is the section projecting the growth of the Ukrainian economy. Since the document is laid out as an investment pitch, the authors must say something about the potential for returns—and since the authors are dealing with a country rather than an individual investment project, they must make the case for how much the Prosperity Roadmap will increase GDP growth in Ukraine. The report states that it expects Ukraine’s per capita GDP to grow at a rate of 6.1 percent per year. This requires 2.1 million people returning to Ukraine after the war. It also requires that labor productivity rise from 1.3 percent before the war to 5 percent after the war. Recall that this document is supposed to be a supplement to plans for Ukraine’s EU accession. So, we must believe that when every Ukrainian is handed a European passport 2.1 million of them will decide to return from Europe to war-torn Ukraine and none will leave. These are absurd assumptions. The same is true for the productivity assumptions. Why would productivity growth increase by 300–400 percent after the economy has been destroyed by war? Surely the baseline assumption should be that extensive amounts of capital goods have been wiped out and so the economy will be less productive than it was before the war.
It is impossible to take the Prosperity Roadmap seriously. It is not a serious policy document. It is an investment pitch—and a bad investment pitch at that. It is clearly an attempt by interested entities to try to convince gullible leaders in the European Commission to hand over vast amounts of taxpayer money to undefined private sector entities that will try to leverage these public funds to get access to private funds. From the perspective of the private entities that would oversee this, it does not matter if they fail completely to unlock private sector funds—the fees on the public sector funds would make the entire project worthwhile. For all its faults, the European Commission was once seen as a relatively competent bureaucracy. The fact that documents like this are circulating in Brussels shows the opposite: the Commission is increasingly seen as a target for unscrupulous private sector interests hoping to bandwagon on popular causes to extract profit.
Endnotes
Sarah Wheaton et al., “Document Reveals EU-US Pitch for $800B Postwar Ukraine ‘Prosperity’ Plan,” Politico, January 23, 2026, https://www.politico.eu/article/document-eu-us-pitch-800b-post-war-prosperity-plan-for-ukraine/.
“Ukraine Prosperity Roadmap: A Vision for Ukraine 2040,” Politico Pro, January 22, 2026, 5.
The Americanized spelling and the use of dollar denominations in a euro-denominated environment once again point to the potential source of the document.
“Ukraine Prosperity Roadmap,” 8–9.
“Ukraine Prosperity Roadmap,” 12.