- Biden and Xi have met for only the second time, demonstrating that US-China relations are at a low point
- The summit marks a temporary easing in relations, but the structural differences run very deep
- Restoring communication channels reduces the likelihood of conflict but does not mark a major breakthrough
- Washington’s goal is to stabilize relations before the US election highlights confrontation with China
- For China, the US election is an opportunity to seize international initiative while the US focuses on its domestic problems.
On November 15, U.S. president Joe Biden and Chinese president Xi Jinping met in suburban San Francisco. It was only the second time since Biden was elected president that they have had a face-to-face meeting, partly due to the COVID-19 pandemic, but also signifying that U.S.-China relations have hit a low point in recent years.
There are structural differences between the two superpowers that are essentially irresolvable, so no one expected a breakthrough or a turnaround. The greatest expectation for the summit was that it would set off the revival of U.S.-China dialogues, forums, cooperation mechanisms and other contacts that had existed on various levels and then came to a halt; and that it would restore communication between the two rivals, which is essential for managing the relationship and preventing conflicts from escalating.
According to information made public so far, this expectation was met during the four-hour meeting. The parties agreed to resume direct communication between the two militaries, which means that in the event of a crisis, such as a collision between a U.S. and a Chinese military aircraft over the Taiwan Strait (which is very likely) they can clarify the situation immediately and avoid escalation. The parties also agreed that in a crisis, the presidents would “pick up the phone” to each other, suggesting some kind of hotline.
It is a sign of the poor state of relations that these steps, which should be evident in the case of the world’s two greatest powers, are already considered a major achievement. A governmental dialogue is being launched on the dangers of artificial intelligence, talks are continuing on climate change, and the number of flights between China and the United States is being increased. Another concrete result was achieved when Xi indicated that he would restrict exports of Chinese raw materials for the synthetic drug fentanyl (the leading cause of death among Americans aged 18–45, with seventy thousand deaths a year). Xi also made a comment about China sending pandas to a U.S. zoo again.
The meeting highlighted the differences between the two sides, which were already evident based on the issues each side wanted to talk about. Xi’s main topic was the general state of U.S.-China relations and, in this context, the fate of the world, the future of humanity, and the avoidance of a Cold War confrontation. Biden, on the other hand, talked about specific issue areas. Xi clearly wished to position China as a great power on an equal footing with the United States and negotiate world affairs with the leader of a world power as the leader of a world power. In contrast, Biden, in line with the traditional U.S. approach, took the high ground, criticizing China over human rights abuses and other issues, called for China to restrain Iran in the Israeli conflict, and then, when asked at the post-event press conference, calling Xi Jinping a “dictator,” to which the Chinese Foreign Ministry immediately objected. Biden used the phrase “trust but verify,” first used by President Reagan regarding the Soviets, to describe his attitude toward Xi, which does not build confidence.
Regarding superpower relations, Xi made it clear that the United States and China face two choices. One is to play a zero-sum game and the conflict and chaos that this entails, and the other is to cooperate in solving the challenges the world face—i.e. to develop some kind of modus vivendi. China would favor the latter and, according to Xi, has no intention of replacing the United States, but expects America not to try to obstruct or restrain it. Relations should be based on the principle of equality, with the parties mutually respecting each other’s fundamental interests and values, seeking peaceful coexistence, and building channels to help resolve conflicts. The U.S. side has sought to avoid these general issues and has not responded to Xi’s proposals, because this in itself would have elevated China on the level of the United States.
The most sensitive issue in bilateral relations is Taiwan, where positions are not converging. Biden reaffirmed his adherence to the “one China policy,” which has been the official U.S. position since 1979 (meaning that Washington acknowledges, but does not accept, Beijing’s view that Taiwan is part of the People’s Republic of China and that it does not recognize Taiwan’s independence, but reserves the right to support the island, for example with arms supplies). This statement by Biden is positive in the sense that, by reaffirming the “one China policy,” he has ruled out the possibility of recognizing Taiwan’s independence, which would practically mean automatic war.
Xi was somewhat tougher than usual on the Taiwan issue, repeating the slogans used so far mainly in domestic communications, saying that “the U.S. must stop arming Taiwan and support the peaceful reunification of China. China will achieve reunification, it cannot be stopped.” He indicated that Beijing favors peaceful reunification but will not shy away from an armed solution if certain conditions are met, and that while peace is important, a real solution must be found sooner or later. All this should be interpreted as meaning that China has no plans to attack Taiwan for the time being, but will not shy away from doing so if the status quo changes to its disadvantage or if the prospect of reunification is pushed into the unforeseeable future.
All in all, the biggest achievement of the meeting is that it has happened in the first place. Some progress was made in reestablishing channels of communication between the two powers, in resuming dialogues and consultations at various levels, and the parties have agreed on certain details. At the same time, the meeting does not set U.S.-China relations on a new course, but only makes them somewhat more predictable and reduces the chances of a conflict erupting because of miscalculation and misunderstanding of the other.
It is worth recalling that a similar détente was set in motion at the previous meeting of the two leaders in Bali in November 2022, but was swept away by the Chinese balloon shoot-down. Why did the parties need relief? From the U.S. side, the answer is clear: the Biden administration must turn its full attention to the presidential campaign. One of the leading themes of the campaign will surely be China, where the candidates will be calling each other out for Cold War–era rants about China. Washington therefore had an interest in improving relations before the election campaign, lest Beijing overreact. Washington was certainly sending a message that rhetoric is different from reality.
In the Biden administration, there is certainly a fear that, in addition to the Russia-Ukraine war and the Israel-Gaza situation, China may trigger a new conflict (the best chance of which is currently the ongoing tussle in the Philippines). In such a situation, Washington would either have to turn a blind eye or show strength. While the first is politically unacceptable, the second response might expose a lack of capacity.
There are two aspects behind Beijing’s interests. On one hand, the Chinese president continues to be attacked by the Western interest group within the Communist Party. They argue that the great power tussle is damaging to business interests and thus a risk to China’s long-term rise. They argue that a good deal can be struck with the Biden administration before the U.S. elections. The president’s circle and leading intellectuals, however, stress that there can be no meaningful agreement with the United States (in Chinese terms: say what needs to be said, but do what needs to be done). China needs to show a constructive face, agreeing verbally on everything. This may buy time and sympathy, it may reassure international investors, but it has no real meaning. In fact, Beijing faces a period of nearly a year to take control of international events and, at the same time, of U.S. domestic policy. It is China’s actions that should be watched first and foremost, as they could be an important indicator of conditions in the next decade. If Beijing gives a soft answer, it is clear that the Chinese Communist Party does not feel strong enough or is unable to keep its internal opposition under control for an open great power competition.
The U.S. position is no longer a question. The Americans believe that it is natural and moral for the United States to be the only global power, while the rest of the world must accept and adapt to it. This difference will continue to be an obstacle to effective dialogue, and the mechanisms that have now been reestablished will only be sufficient to keep relations on an even keel.
Written by Viktor Eszterhai & Gergely Salát