1. Real European leadership emerges from the cooperation of member states and the main EU institutions
In the EU, leadership differs from how it is conceived in the member states. Wielding power in the Union is much less centralised and does not revolve around a single leader the way it does in a sovereign state. Cooperation and consensus-building among member states is crucial in the Council of Ministers and the European Council, resembling the working of intergovernmental organisations.The EU is more than this however, as without the supranational-minded Commission’s proposal and the directly elected Parliament’s consent, nothing can sail through its decision-making machinery. Such mutual dependence means that leadership in the EU must be a result of the collective action of multiple players, its alternatives being political deadlock or the use of sheer force. Outstanding European leaders in the past, be they Commission presidents like Jacques Delors or member state leaders like Helmut Kohl, could navigate through such a political minefield and forge a wide consensus among the various players behind their vision.
2. The EU lacks the type of visionary leaders Jacques Delors was
The EU has been living in a near-constant state of crisis since 2008, and we have often witnessed a striking inability on the part of European leaders and institutions to deal with problems in an adequate, timely and coordinated fashion. The financial and euro crises, migrant crisis, Covid, war in Ukraine, energy crisis, the political and economic challenge posed by China would all have required swift and determined decision-making, which was generally not provided, for leadership was lacking.
The current problems with the EU leadership are a direct result of the inability (or unwillingness) of European governments to agree on a team that has a clear and strong vision for Europe. None of the main European institutions’ current leaders were first choices – with the exception of Christine Lagarde. Their election had little to do with their seniority and experience, and everything to do with the ever-complex world of EU politics, where consensus, institutional turf wars and quotas often trump political strategy.
Related to this, a new form of conservatism is spreading in the political leadership. The protagonists are primarily concerned with retaining power and the political status quo. Unlike in Jacques Delors’s time, reform plans are coming not from the EU’s leaders (both institutional and member state) but from lower levels: MEPs and experts.
3. The lack of legitimate leadership casts a shadow on the effectiveness of the EU
All leadership implies inequality and therefore requires solid justification, especially in the democratic European context. However, at the European level, sources of legitimacy that provide such justification are weak and contradictory (e.g. the technocratic legitimacy of Commission bureaucrats vs. the democratic legitimacy of governments), thereby tempting leaders to overstep the level of justification bestowed upon them. This, in turn, serves only to exacerbate the inherent tension between EU leadership and the notion of popular self-determination that members states’ sovereignty is based upon.
Nonetheless, when the real leaders of the EU are considered to be certain heads of government/state (mostly that of the Franco-German tandem), the question of legitimacy arises again, just in another form. However strong their democratic empowerment at home, they have no legitimacy whatsoever originating from the EU’s electorate as a whole. The lack of legitimacy will always work against effective leadership and create a popular backlash against those at the EU’s top.
4. Ineffective EU leadership, in turn, further harms legitimacy
The EU’s leaders claim two main legitimating sources for themselves: the technocratic legitimacy of the EU’s bureaucracy (mainly the Commission) springing from the implication of being the best prepared and having the best capabilities to identify and resolve the challenges facing the EU; and the democratic legitimacy of the European Parliament and national governments in the Council of Ministers and European Council, grounded in popular election (in practice this means a national electorate even for MEPs). The problem is, these sources of legitimacy are transactional in nature and rely on output legitimacy. That is, voters expect the Commission and its bureaucrats to effectively implement key policy issues and politicians to deliver their electoral programme. However, the economic downturn and political instability caused by the polycrisis has dealt a serious blow to the quality of output: the economic downturns, the lagging reactions and partial solutions to urgent matters corroded the legitimacy of the EU to decide on so many facets of its citizens’ life.
5. Centralisation does not result in better EU leadership, but rather in the dominance of big states
Calls for a strong, centralised EU leadership may further exacerbate the EU’s legitimacy crisis, thereby reducing the effectiveness of decision making. The calls for extending majoritarianism would in practice mean more power to bigger member states and taking away leverage from smaller ones. The EU is a polity with many leaders, and was purposely designed as such, so that in compromising everyone can feel a winner, hence sharing a decision’s benefits but also the responsibility for it. This does not stand in majoritarianism, whereby actors might be permanently excluded from being on the winner’s side, and, due to their grievances, they might turn into unconstructive players.
Written by Jad Marcell Harb