1. The European Parliament elections will be June 6–9, and Hungary will send 21 MEPs (3% of the total)
The European Parliament is the only institution in the EU where the will of the citizens of the EU is directly expressed, as it is up to the voters to decide who represents them. The EP’s influence has increased recently and in many cases it is trying to influence the work of other EU institutions on political grounds. Although the EP does not have a government side or an opposition, but rather political groups, it is not always the certain which group will be the strongest. This is most influenced by the EU citizens who vote in the EP elections.
Members of the European Parliament are directly elected in all Member States and are elected based on their results in national elections. Countries with a larger population can send more MEPs to the EP, but the principle of degressive proportionality allows less populous Member States to have more MEPs per capita, avoiding overrepresenting larger states. Hungary sends 21 MEPs to the EP, 3% of the 705 MEPs, while the country represents 2.1% of the EU’s population.
2. This year’s EP elections are a litmus test of ideology-driven politics, a battle between sovereigntists and the „Brussels bubble”
The complete antithesis of populism occurs when technocratic elites—or what many refer to as the Brussels bubble—force policy action in the absence of real political support. The EP’s years of unthinking green policies in response to economic difficulties is a prime example of this phenomenon. This election will show whether there is real support for it and, if so, exactly how much. Many people expect the EP elections to result in a strengthening of the Right against the Greens and Liberals, and within that, a reshuffling of the political groups, with a major role for the radical Right.
3. A strengthening of all right-wing parties is expected, and strong coalition unifying them is likely
A major consequence of the great right-wing advance will be that the radical Right will be strengthened and transformed, and the European People’s Party could also make good progress. The proportions of these two changes are difficult to predict. The most likely scenario is that those who do not want to cooperate with extremist parties, such as the AfD, will seek opportunities with more moderate but more conservative parties compared to the centrist EPP. This could lead to a strengthening of the European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR) at the expense of Identity and Democracy (ID). This could mean that if the ECR succeeds in attracting MEPs from ID or even elsewhere, even some old ECR members may leave the party, as some MEPs are reluctant to work with the migrating members of IR.
Czech prime minister Petr Fiala’s party (ODS) may be moving towards the EPP, opening the way for Andrej Babiš to move towards the ECR. The clear leader of the ID is currently the French National Alliance (RN) led by Le Pen, but if it could reach an accommodation with Meloni’s Fratelli d’Italia and the Polish PiS, the ECR could become a very significant force with them, while the successor to the ID would bring together representatives of the smaller Dutch, Belgian, Swedish, Austrian radical right parties (with or without AfD). The Slovak SMER and HLAS will also not necessarily remain in the same party family (HLAS is currently in the Socialists and Democrats group, while SMER has been expelled), and although they are not conservative, they would fit well in a re-forming ECR group together with the sovereigntist parties.
4. The search for post-election alliances is very likely to be decided by issues such as peace
Even though both ECR and ID are right-wing parties, there are major differences between them, the most visible of which is their attitude to the war in Ukraine: for example, ECR actively supports assisting Ukraine in the war. The ECR is for the EU in the case of the Ukraine. However, it is also important to note that it is primarily domestic political dynamics that determine the positioning of each party within the EP, and this is no different among the radical Right parties. Le Pen’s decision to distance herself from the German far-right AfD, for example, is an important strategic move, primarily in terms of domestic politics, as she prepares for the French presidential elections.
5. Hungary can benefit from the advance of the sovereigntist forces and can play an important role in shaping the European Right
In Hungary, opinion polls show a clear lead for the governing Fidesz-KDNP party, ahead of the Tisza Party, which is running for the first time in the elections, and Momentum, which is in third place and just around the threshold for entry. It is most likely that no other party can win seats. The Tisza Party MPs are unlikely to be admitted to the EPP, but they will be supported from outside, while Fidesz will still have the option of joining the ECR, ID or a new right-wing grouping. The strengthening of the Right is in Hungary’s interest, because in the currently geopolitically weakened EU it can bring progress on issues of importance to Hungary, such as migration, ending the war, or stronger European defense.