1. Bosnia and Herzegovina has been a flashpoint in the middle of the Balkan as the area of imperial transition over the centuries
Due to its geographical location, Bosnia and Herzegovina has been a constant point of conflict between the great powers throughout history. Medieval Bosnian state structures fell victim to the expansion of stronger neighboring kingdoms and then to the Ottoman Empire. The Ottoman advance left a permanent imprint on the ethnic map of the Balkans and influenced the identity formation of the Balkan peoples. The millet systems that emerged due to the Ottoman administrative structure created religious blocs, which separated the Slavic peoples of the Balkans on religious grounds. The threads of Hungarian history are also closely intertwined with the history of the Balkan states, not only because of their common Ottoman past. Bosnia and Herzegovina has a vibrant history; with Hungary, as part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, playing a significant role in the modernization and nation-building of Bosnia and Herzegovina at the turn of the 19th and 20th centuries. In creating the Dayton structure, the policymakers also looked to the example of the Austro-Hungarian Empire as a model for the reconstruction of Bosnia and Herzegovina after the Yugoslav war.
2. The Dayton structure determines political instability in Bosnia and Herzegovina
Bosnia and Herzegovina, which is ethnically and religiously heterogeneous, was put on a new footing in the Dayton Agreement of 1995, which ended the Bosnian war. The Dayton structure provided a temporary solution to the country’s problems, but today we can see that the system established by the international community cannot stabilize Bosnia and Herzegovina. There are ongoing tensions between the two entities and the three constituent nations, and the complex political structure and bureaucratic nature of the state administration system is an obstacle to effective decision-making. Despite the active involvement and mediation of international actors, Bosnia and Herzegovina is facing a persistent constitutional crisis, which illustrates the shortcomings of the Daytonian structure. Entities have the primary responsibility to create political stability and the international community should provide all the assistance to Bosnia and Herzegovina to achieve this. European Union integration can be a way of overcoming tensions within the country, but beyond that, Bosnia and Herzegovina must be helped in terms of its integrity and authority.
3. Hungary is a strong and consistent supporter of Bosnia and Herzegovina’s accession to the European Union
Although a general disillusionment with the issue of integration among local political elites has taken hold after President Macron’s EU enlargement halt in 2019, the current momentum for enlargement is genuine – but it stems primarily not from a recognition of local dynamics, but from geopolitical intentions interpreted in the shadow of the war in Ukraine. This is evident from the fact that suspicion of the Western Balkan candidate countries has not disappeared, and they are still seen as second-tier candidates, as illustrated by the fact that Bosnia and Herzegovina was only granted candidate status in December 2022, after Ukraine and Moldova, and only belatedly, on 21 March 2024, received the green light to start accession negotiations. In the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina, integration and maintaining the ‘Daytonian system’ seem to be two separate priorities: while progress on the one is always conditional, the West is also increasingly rhetorical on the other. Hungary is a staunch supporter of Bosnia and Herzegovina’s EU accession, as it is a geopolitical, security, and economic interest. It is therefore in our country’s interest to assist this process both locally and in the EU arena, the presence of a Hungarian EU integration expert in the country is a good indication of our commitment.
4. The EU peacekeeping mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina has been led by a Hungarian commander since January
Hungary is not only emphasising in its narrative the stability and security of the Western Balkans and Bosnia and Herzegovina, but is also actively taking action. Our country is excelling – first among the V4 countries – in terms of troop numbers, both in NATO’s peacekeeping mission in Kosovo and in the European Union’s mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina, EUFOR Althea. After Hungary proved its ability to lead a NATO operation under Major General Ferenc Kajári’s command of KFOR, this year for the first time EUFOR Althea is be led by a Hungarian commander, Major General László Sticz (in the Althea mission Hungary was responsible for chief of staff between 2010 and 2023). In addition to the military-diplomatic success, this is a strong signal to our country’s partners in the West that they trust the Hungarian Defence Forces and thus our country’s preparedness and expertise. It should be noted that Hungary is the first former socialist, Central European country to take command of these two international missions. The large troop contribution to the mission is also justified by the perception that we are moving towards a more dangerous, unpredictable world, which requires the development of military capabilities. Hungarian soldiers can thus gain irreplaceable foreign mission experience in low-risk environment.
5. Hungary is the only channel of communication between the Bosnian Serb leadership and Euro-Atlantic partners
Among the Western Balkan countries, Hungary’s relations with Bosnia and Herzegovina are sometimes more strained because of Budapest’s good relations with the Republika Srpska, with which the central government of Bosnia and Herzegovina is engaged in an ongoing sovereignty struggle. Although Sarajevo knows that Hungary is a committed supporter of EU integration, it is understandably tense that Budapest is seen as one of the most important international partners of the secessionist Bosnian Serb President Milorad Dodik. Yet the logic of Hungary’s divisive foreign policy is consistent: to maintain a dialogue with the elected political leaders of the region, with the result that Hungary often serves as the sole channel of communication between Milorad Dodik and his Western partners. The Hungarian EU Presidency and Budapest’s commitment to timely and full-fledged integration may now give a new impetus to relations, as Budapest will not only be a supporter of integration but will also play an agenda-setting role. Hungary can use its unique role as a “bridge” to facilitate the domestic political compromise needed (also) for EU accession as well as to represent the interests of the conflicting parties in the EU arena. Hungary is therefore keeping its channels of communication open in all directions, and Prime Minister Viktor Orbán’s visit to Bosnia and Herzegovina fits into this foreign policy model.
Written by Tamás Péter Baranyi