

**Evaluating the Positions of the Visegrád Group
and the Benelux Union on the EU Enlargement Policy
and the EU Accession of the Western Balkan Countries**

A Visegrádi Együttműködés és a Benelux Unió országai
álláspontjainak értékelése az EU bővítéspolitikájának
és a nyugat-balkáni országok EU-s csatlakozásának tükrében

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KKI Policy Brief

Series of the Institute for Foreign Affairs and Trade

Publisher:

Institute for Foreign Affairs and Trade

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Typesetting:

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ISSN 2416-0148



Abstract: This analysis provides a comparative overview of the positions of two unilateral groups, the Benelux Union and the Visegrád Group, regarding EU enlargement. The relevance and value in this comparison lies in the nature of the two compared country groupings, comparing the attitudes on EU enlargement of the 'old' EU members to those of the 'new' EU members. The primary objective of the paper is to explore the differences in the EU enlargement position between the Visegrád Group and the Benelux Union by examining government officials' statements, trends in European Parliament voting behaviours, and public opinion on the enlargement debate of the Western Balkan counties.

Keywords: Visegrád Group, Benelux Union, EU, European Parliament, Western Balkan

Összefoglaló: Az elemzés egy összehasonlító áttekintést ad két minilaterális csoport, a Benelux Unió és a Visegrádi Együttműködés álláspontjairól az EU bővítéspolitikájával kapcsolatban. Az összehasonlítás relevanciája és értéke a két összehasonlítani kívánt országcsoport eltérő jellegében van, nevezetesen az EU „rég” és „új” tagországainak EU-s bővítéspolitikával összefüggő pozícióinak összevetése. Az elemzés elsődleges célja a Visegrádi Együttműködés és a Benelux Unió országainak bővítéspolitikára vonatkozó álláspontbéli különbségeinek feltérképezése, melyet hivatalos kormányzati nyilatkozatok, európai parlamenti szavazási viselkedések, valamint a nyugat-balkáni országok bővítési vitájára vonatkozó közvélemény alapján fogok megválaszolni.

Kulcsszavak: Visegrádi Együttműködés, Benelux Unió, EU, Európai Parlament, Nyugat-Balkán

INTRODUCTION

Despite the various hardships the European Union (EU) has been facing lately, many neighbouring EU candidate countries are committed to joining the bloc. Enlargement has historically been a relatively regular occurrence within the EU. The first wave of accessions took place in 1973, when Denmark, Ireland, and the United Kingdom joined the six founding members Germany, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Belgium, and Luxembourg in the [European integration project](#). Further enlargement processes and accessions followed throughout the years, increasing the number of EU Member States up to twenty-seven today; acknowledging that the EU consisted of twenty-eight members prior to the United Kingdom's EU exit.

As discussions on the accession process of Western Balkan candidate countries i.e. the Republic of Albania, Montenegro, the Republic of North Macedonia, and the Republic of Serbia, are ongoing (Bosnia and Herzegovina is aspiring to become a candidate country for EU accession), many reforms and efforts have been

made by Western Balkan governments to showcase their willingness and commitment to comply with EU expectations. Yet, after Croatia joined the EU in July 2013, [the vision of enlarging the union has arguably faded](#) and further commitments are proceeding quite slowly in comparison to previous negotiations. It [appears](#) that today individual EU Member States and their national politics hold larger political weight in accession discussions than the European Commission and other EU institutions, thus exercising greater influence on accession proceedings of EU candidates. It is therefore important to analyse trends in the national positions of EU member states towards the EU enlargement process within this context.

French President Emmanuel Macron [has brought to the fore](#) the necessity to fix the existing malfunctioning of the EU and enjoys the support of other member states, such as Denmark and the Netherlands. In October 2019, the European Council did not reach an agreement on opening EU accession negotiations with North Macedonia and Albania. France vetoed negotiation proceedings for both countries, while [the Netherlands blocked only Albania](#). Although an agreement was reached later in [March this year](#), many European leaders and EU politicians had expressed their disappointment and concerns over the October result. EU officials have [highlighted](#) that North Macedonia and Albania did implement all the demanded undertakings, making the outcome of the Council disappointing for many. Not all EU Member States have shared the sceptic view of enlargement. The members of the Visegrád Group showcase a cooperative attitude towards the Western Balkans and EU enlargement in general. The four Central European countries, all of which became EU members in 2004, fully [support](#) the Balkan nations' pathway towards official EU membership. It is noteworthy that the new commissioner for Neighbourhood and Enlargement is a Hungarian official, [Olivér Várhelyi](#). He is given, among many other tasks, the responsibility to credibly manage enlargement negotiations, with a strong emphasis on providing progress in the accession procedure of the Western Balkans, most notably North Macedonia and Albania.

This research is built on qualitative and quantitative comparisons. Sources include various public statements from government officials, voting patterns in the EP, and data on public opinion. The analysis starts with a brief review of political communications and previously conducted research on the EU Enlargement positions of the countries analysed in this paper. Statements from government officials are reviewed to evaluate attitudes towards EU enlargement. In the second section, the voting results of Members of the EP (MEPs) from the Benelux Union and the Visegrád Group are compared. The final part of the analysis examines the public opinion on EU enlargement in the Benelux Union and the Visegrád Group countries. Finally, a review interprets the results. The research question can be formulated as the following:

Are there positional divergences between the Visegrád Group and the Benelux Union towards EU Enlargement in the Western Balkans, and do they reflect EP votes and public opinion?



THE BENELUX UNION AND THE VISEGRÁD GROUP

Differences among member states regarding EU enlargement as a whole are noticeable, and opinions on the accession process itself also seem highly divided. The Visegrád Group, having a mostly pro-accession position as regards the Western Balkans and a supportive role on EU enlargement in general, has accumulated important political weight in the European Union since their accession in 2004. Many political and economic minilateral groups among a small number of member states exist within the EU to foster ties at a regional level and strengthen their political significance to the outside. The Benelux Union is a Western European cooperation, consisting of three members: the Netherlands, Belgium, and Luxembourg. The process of integration for the three Benelux Union countries [started in 1943](#), with the signature of the Benelux monetary convention. All three members of the Benelux Union are founding members of the European Union. Luxembourg and Brussels are official EU capitals as well. The Visegrád Group, also often referred to as V4, [is a cooperative group](#) formed by the 'newer' EU Member States Poland, Czechia, Slovakia, and Hungary in February 1991. The [interests](#) of the Visegrád Group primarily lie in increasing regional cooperation, especially with neighbouring countries, to stabilise the Central European region and improve European security.

OVERVIEW OF GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS' STATEMENTS ON WESTERN BALKAN EU ACCESSION

As already mentioned, the Netherlands and Denmark have supported the French veto to deny advanced accession negotiations with North Macedonia and Albania. According to [Steven Blockmans](#), Head of EU Foreign Policy and Head of Institutional Affairs at CEPS, the Dutch rhetoric on EU accession is based on strict and accountable conditionality. The Dutch government does not discourage EU enlargement per se but implies high-standard conditions that need to be implemented by candidates in a manner of true commitment. Furthermore, the Netherlands also underlines the importance of evaluating the current capacity of the EU to absorb new member states. After a visit to Tirana in January 2019 by Dutch Minister of Foreign Affairs Stef Blok, the Dutch government published a [diplomatic statement](#) confirming the Netherlands' support for Albania's pathway towards EU accession and acknowledged the serious efforts taken by the Albanian government to bring the country closer to EU membership conformity. However, the statement also underlines that Albania needs to continue fighting against organised crime and corruption. Another [diplomatic statement](#) following a visit by the Dutch Minister of Foreign Affairs to Belgrade reiterates the Dutch attitude towards the Western Balkans, expressing strong support for the EU membership

targets of the Western Balkan countries, while emphasising the importance of the rule of law, a merit-based accession process, and the necessity to implement indispensable reforms. The Netherlands highlights the importance of conditionality in the EU enlargement debate, as the Dutch consider it the most effective tool in pushing the developmental progress of candidate countries.

Former Belgian Foreign Affairs Minister Didier Reynders [expressed his support](#) of the Western Balkan EU accession in February 2018 in Sofia, stating that *"I am sure that the future of all the Western Balkan countries is in the European Union"*. The Brussels Times [reported](#) that former Belgian Prime Minister (now President of the European Council) Charles Michel underlines the importance of strengthening strategic relationships with the Western Balkans and guiding them on their path towards improved democracy, rule of law, and the implementation of fundamental rights. After not coming to an agreement during the Council in October last year, Luxembourg Minister for European and Foreign Affairs Jean Asselborn [expressed his disappointment](#), saying that the EU should send positive signals towards the Western Balkans and acknowledge the tremendous progress that has been made by the Western Balkan governments. During a meeting with Bulgarian Minister of Foreign Affairs Ekaterina Zaharieva, Jean Asselborn [has repeated](#) that Europe has made a mistake by not agreeing to open accession negotiations with North Macedonia and Albania in October 2019.

On the other hand, historical, proximity, and economic reasons [are argued](#) to drive the V4's positive stance towards Western Balkan EU accession. The Benelux Union is understood to put greater focus on the state of democracy, the rule of law, and the well-functioning of the institutions of EU candidates and is therefore more rigid towards EU membership candidates. The four members of the V4 agree on a common position in certain policy areas, [including their support for the Western Balkans' EU accession](#). The Prime Ministers of the V4 [shared their disappointment](#) after the EU could not agree on opening EU accession talks with North Macedonia and Albania in October 2019. As Poland is not located in close proximity to the Western Balkan region, [according to Tomasz Żornaczuk](#), Head of the Central Europe Programme and Senior Research Fellow on Western Balkan EU Enlargement at the Polish Institute of International Affairs, this is maybe one of the explanations why Poland's political interests in the Western Balkans are more or less limited to stabilisation and security. Poland is strongly in favour of EU enlargement but seems to prioritise its attention towards the countries of the Eastern Partnerships, such as Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova, and Georgia. In similar language as the Dutch Minister of Foreign Affairs, Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs Jacek Czaputowicz [elaborated during a panel discussion](#) at the World Economic Forum in Davos in January 2019 that the EU enlargement policy is a highly effective instrument to stabilise the Western Balkan region and stimulate economic development. During a European summit in Poznan, the Polish President [stated](#) that Poland supports solidarity and openness regarding the EU project and considers the Western Balkans an important region to further promote stability and development within Europe.



Czech Prime Minister Babiš [said during a summit](#) of the V4 Prime Ministers in September 2019 that he firmly believes the EU must include the Western Balkans in its future perspectives and that the Western Balkans belong inside the European Union. He also said that EU membership helps the Western Balkan region foster stability, security, democracy, and development. Former Slovak Foreign Affairs Minister Miroslav Lajčák [shares these views](#), saying that *“the Western Balkans provide a strategic investment in European Union’s security and prosperity”*.

A very active proponent of Western Balkan EU accession is Hungary. The country is situated in close proximity to the Western Balkans and shares a border with Serbia on its south. On 24 October, 2019, only 6 days after Albania and North Macedonia had been blocked from opening EU accession negotiations by France, the Netherlands, and Denmark, Hungarian Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade Péter Szijjártó confirmed Hungary’s strong support of Western Balkan EU accession in a press statement, following a meeting with the Albanian Prime Minister in Tirana. According to Szijjártó, integrating the Western Balkans into the EU is of high interest to Hungarian security, strategic, and economic policy. Beáta Huszka, assistant professor at Eötvös Loránd University (ELTE), also claims that Hungary’s enthusiasm and commitment towards EU enlargement, and especially in the case of the Western Balkans, derive from Hungary’s economic and strategic interests. Additionally, Hungary also seeks to further improve Hungarian minority rights within the Western Balkans, such as in northern Serbia.

The Ministers of Foreign Affairs of both the Benelux Union and the V4 countries recently met in Brussels on 8 December, 2019 to further promote dialogue and understanding between the nations of both groups. Among others, both parties agreed that the reunification of Europe is considered a priority, that the European Union must not lose credibility in the Western Balkan accession procedure and thrive for an efficient and constructive accession process. A [joint statement](#) of the Ministers of the Benelux Union and the V4 communicates the following: *“Ministers agreed that the EU perspective on future accession of the Western Balkan countries needs to remain credible and they are ready to engage constructively in an effort to enhance the effectiveness of the accession process.”*

THE VOTING BEHAVIOUR OF THE BENELUX UNION AND THE V4 MEMBERS OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT

To examine these positions through the relevant voting patterns in the EP, the V4 and Benelux MEPs’ votes on the enlargement resolutions are examined below, using official data from the [European Parliament](#) website. First, during the voting session of 9 April, 2003 on accepting the enlargement wave of 2004, all but one of the Benelux MEPs voted in favour of accepting the giv-

en nations as EU member states. During the 13 April, 2005 voting session on Bulgaria's and Romania's accession in 2007, the number of abstain votes increased slightly. Within this session, the number of Dutch MEPs supporting the accession of candidate countries decreased in comparison to the voting session of 2003. Furthermore, a considerable number of Dutch MEPs voted against. On 1 December, 2011, almost 20 percent of Dutch MEPs voted against accepting Croatia as a new EU member state. Yet none of the Belgian and Luxembourg MEPs voted against Croatia's EU membership. Approximately a third of the Belgian MEPs abstained, were absent, or did not vote. Lastly, during the 24 October voting session on opening accession negotiations with North Macedonia and Albania, more than half of the Dutch MEPs voted against. 4 out of 21 Belgian MEPs voted against the accession negotiation openings, while 11 have voted in favour. None of the Luxembourg MEPs voted against, while only 3 out of 6 voted in favour.

Table 1
EP voting behaviour on EU enlargement recommendations

9 April, 2003	EP vote on adopting Czechia, Estonia, Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Malta, Poland, Slovenia, and Slovakia as EU Member States
13 April, 2005	EP vote on adopting Bulgaria and Romania as EU Member States
1 December, 2011	EP vote on adopting Croatia as an EU Member State
24 October, 2019	EP vote on opening accession negotiations with North Macedonia and Albania

Aggregate average of 'Against' votes of Benelux Union MEPs
(% relative to total number of national MEPs)

Votes 'Against'	(9 April, 2003)	(13 April, 2005)	(1 December, 2011)	(24 October, 2019)
NL	0.00	18.5	19.2	53.8
BE	3.60	14.6	0.00	19.0
LU	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00



Aggregate average of 'For' votes of Benelux Union MEPs
(% relative to total number of national MEPs)

Votes 'For'	(9 April, 2003)	(13 April, 2005)	(1 December, 2011)	(24 October, 2019)
NL	90.0	57.4	61.5	30.8
BE	84.0	62.5	68.2	52.4
LU	50.0	83.3	83.3	50.0

Aggregate average of 'Abstain' votes of Benelux Union MEPs
(% relative to total number of national MEPs)

Votes 'Abstain'	(9 April, 2003)	(13 April, 2005)	(1 December, 2011)	(24 October, 2019)
NL	0.00	14.8	3.80	0.00
BE	4.40	8.30	18.2	14.3
LU	16.7	8.30%	0.00	16.7

Aggregate average 'Against' votes of V4 MEPs
(% relative to total number of national MEPs)

Votes 'Against'	(13 April, 2005)	(1 December, 2011)	(24 October, 2019)
PL	1.90	0.00	0.00
CZ	0.00	9.10	9.50
SK	0.00	0.00	7.70
HU	0.00	5.00	0.00

**Aggregate average of 'For' votes of V4 MEPs
(% relative to total number of national MEPs)**

Votes 'For'	(13 April, 2005)	(1 December, 2011)	(24 October, 2019)
PL	92.6	78.4	74.5
CZ	97.9	77.3	81.0
SK	92.9	76.9	84.6
HU	89.6	68.2	61.9

**Aggregate average of 'Abstain' votes of V4 MEPs
(% relative to national MEPs)**

Votes 'Abstain'	(13 April, 2005)	(1 December, 2011)	(24 October, 2019)
PL	2.80	0.00	0.00
CZ	2.10	0.00	4.80
SK	0.00	0.00	0.00
HU	0.00	0.00	0.00

Source: Author's own calculations, using data from the of the [European Parliament](#). (Table does not indicate absent or not voting MEPs)

During the voting session in the European Parliament on 13 April, 2005, the V4 countries were more supportive of the EU accession of Bulgaria and Romania than the Benelux countries. However, during the vote on Croatian EU membership on 1 December, 2011, this divergence faded a bit. A stronger divergence between both groups reappears during the vote on opening accession negotiations with North Macedonia and Albania. On average, the V4 MEPs have expressed stronger support for progressing with North Macedonia's and Albania's EU accession discussions than the Benelux Union MEPs. Yet, since the Bulgaria and Romania accession resolution in 2005, the votes in favour have also dropped in the V4 countries. During the vote in October last year, Czech and Slovak MEPs on average voted more in favour; however, only one of the Hungarian and Polish MEPs submitted an against vote in this case.



The MEPs' votes on the accession and enlargement resolution voting data indicate diverging positions between the two groups. The V4 MEPs generally have stronger support for enlargement than the Benelux Union. In the analysed voting sessions, the Dutch MEPs are the most sceptical towards enlargement. The Luxembourg MEPs have never voted against accepting any accession or enlargement resolution in these cases. According to a [Votewatch Europe analysis](#), the degree of influence EU members have on European Neighbourhood and Enlargement policies vary, with Hungary and Slovakia exercising greater influence over the matter than any Benelux Union member. The Netherlands is the most influential member of the Benelux Union, while Luxembourg is considered to be one of the least influential EU member states in this subject.

After examining the EP votes, it can be concluded that MEPs show similar trends in their position as their respective governments. The Dutch MEPs have voted against the most. Especially after the accession wave of 2004, trends in the Benelux MEP votes show a shift towards a more rigorous perspective on EU enlargement. This may suggest greater caution among the Benelux MEPs, sharing the attitude of their governments that EU enlargement is only of benefit when conditionality notions are respected and adequate measures are applied. The voting behaviour of the Luxembourg MEPs can be considered as more diplomatic, as they seem to opt for an abstain vote instead of an against vote. The more supportive position of the V4 governments is equally observable in the EP votes, with Poland the largest supporter within the EP. Although V4 MEP votes in favour of candidate EU accession have slightly decreased since the Romania and Bulgaria resolution, the MEPs of the V4 have shown stronger support in favour of EU enlargement than the Benelux MEPs. Similarly, the official stance of the V4 governments may translate into the voting behaviour of their MEPs.

PUBLIC OPINION ON THE ENLARGEMENT OF THE EUROPEAN UNION

The final part of the analysis evaluates public opinion on EU enlargement, using data from Eurobarometer. Although [it has been stated](#) that public opinion on the EU accession of the Western Balkan countries does not seem to significantly influence the official national position of EU member states on the debate, it is still worth assessing the development of public opinion on the topic. Additionally, the [Dutch referendum](#) has shown that public opinion can impose pressure on politics. The European Commission published a [Special Eurobarometer in July 2006](#), a bit more than two years after ten new member states officially joined the EU in 2004 and just before the official accession of Bulgaria and Romania in 2007.

The Special Eurobarometer concludes that, at that time, candidate countries and the new member countries of 2004 expressed largely positive attitudes towards EU enlargement. The older member states presented as more reserved and

conservative in comparison. The Polish, Czech, and Slovak respondents were the most optimistic regarding EU enlargement bringing benefits. Hungarians gave more neutral responses, while Luxembourg and Belgian respondents expected more problems arising from enlargement. A good number of Dutch respondents responded positively (23 percent - above the EU average) considering EU enlargement benefits. However, 57 percent still expressed concerns about problems stemming from EU enlargement. Additionally, regarding the general perceptions of EU enlargement, the V4 countries consistently responded more positively than the Benelux Union countries. The only exception to this is Belgium, which has continuously ranked at a similar level as the V4 countries. Moreover, Benelux Union respondents tended to believe that human and minority rights are one of the main challenges of the Western Balkans to their road to EU membership.

Table 2

V4 and Benelux summary of question QD16 – “Once each of the following countries complies with all conditions set by the European Union, would you be strongly in favour or opposed to accession of each of them to the European Union?” (in %)

	North Macedonia		Albania		Bosnia and Herzegovina		Serbia & Montenegro*		Croatia	
	For	Against	For	Against	For	Against	For	Against	For	Against
NL	64	29	55	38	63	32	61	34	68	27
BE	57	40	42	54	53	44	53	44	62	36
LU	36	54	29	62	36	55	33	57	44	47
PL	63	19	59	23	61	20	60	22	70	13
CZ	51	40	29	62	46	46	49	44	80	15
SK	63	26	34	54	53	35	56	32	83	8
HU	45	42	32	56	45	42	43	45	81	11
EU	49	36	41	44	48	37	47	39	56	30

Source: Author’s own analysis, using data from the [Special Eurobarometer 2006](#)

* Serbia and Montenegro have been separate autonomous nations since June 2006.



As presented in Table 2 above, question QD16, which tests to what extent the factor of conditionality affects public opinion, gives interesting results. Croatia, an official EU member state since 2013, has enjoyed the most public support in every examined country by quite a large margin. The accession of Albania was supported the least in each country. The Luxembourg population was the most pessimistic towards the EU accession of the Western Balkan nations. Respondents from both Poland and the Netherlands responded in favour of all listed Western Balkan nations the most. Albania's accession was clearly supported the least in both the Benelux Union and the V4 countries. Hungarians have indicated more reserved sentiments towards the perspective of those Western Balkan countries joining the EU, with the exception of Croatia. Considering that this data is quite old, much has changed in Europe and within the EU. Thus, it is essential to observe the evolutionary tendency of public opinion. Data from the [Standard Eurobarometer from 2001 to 2019](#) (see graphic visualisations in Appendix A & B) show that the countries of the Benelux Union responded more positively to the question if they are in favour of further EU Enlargement prior to the EU enlargement of 2004 than they did in recent years. As for the Netherlands, [Steven Blockmans](#) names the opening of accession negotiations with Turkey in 2005 as a major cause for the growing negative attitudes in the Netherlands concerning EU enlargement. A [document on the state of the European Union 2013](#), published by the Dutch government, expresses sceptical attitudes, describing that the Netherlands has experienced adverse social consequences such as a disproportionately high influx of migrants from new EU Member States due to the EU enlargement. As the date of the EU accession of 10 new countries had neared, the positivity of the Benelux Union population towards further EU enlargement dropped slightly.

Starting from fall 2015, the data shows that the Benelux Union countries are heavily trending to be more against further EU enlargement than the V4 countries. Only respondents from Czechia have expressed similar doubtful views on further enlarging the European Union, having the lowest number of responses in favour of EU enlargement among the V4 countries. Poland, Hungary, and Slovakia were consistently the most in favour of further EU enlargement and also consistently above the EU average. In comparison, the responses in favour of EU enlargement from the Benelux Union and Czechia are mostly below the EU average. Yet, in both the V4 and the Benelux Union, the share of responses in favour of EU enlargement have been increasing recently. The same tendency can be observed for the EU average. Only the Dutch population is more negative towards further EU enlargement, as their responses in favour of enlargement fluctuate around the 30 percent mark and do not indicate a clear trajectory. It must be noted that the results from this question do not show which countries are the most desired by the respondents to join the European Union. The Standard Eurobarometers of spring 2010 and fall 2018 show that EU citizens are significantly more in favour of countries such as Switzerland, Norway, or Iceland to join the European Union and significantly less supportive of the idea of Turkey, Kosovo, and Albania joining the EU. However, Graham Avery, Senior Adviser at the European Policy Centre



(EPC), Senior Member of St. Antony's College of Oxford University, and Honorary Director-General of the European Union [believes](#) that those differences in opinion on specific candidate countries are still not researched enough and correctly understood.

CONCLUSION



Although an agreement has been reached this year, the initial failure to agree on continuing EU accession discussions with North Macedonia and Albania was controversial. It is noticeable that especially the Dutch government has a more merit-based approach to EU enlargement by giving high priority to conformity and conditionality in addition to the capacity to integrate new members of the EU. Dutch and Belgian government officials welcome the prospect of new EU members, but only if certain criteria are met. While government officials of the V4 countries also show high support for Western Balkan EU accession, they do not seem to foreground such conditionality. A difference in MEP voting behaviours is also observable: the MEPs of the V4 countries have generally been more in favour of enlargement resolutions than those from the Benelux countries. While the Benelux MEPs were highly supportive of the large EU accession wave of 2004, the support of Dutch MEPs has dropped considerably since then – arguably mirroring the Dutch government's attitude towards EU accession. Compared to the V4, the Benelux population also seems more sceptical about further EU accessions. However, it is also apparent that the degree of support is dependent on the country wishing to join. Thus, the population within the Benelux Union places similar importance on conditionality. As demonstrated by this example, the debate on how EU enlargement should ideally function continues as different Member States share diverse attitudes and positions which are influenced by various perspectives.





APPENDIX A





'For EU enlargement' 2001/2004 - 2008 – Standard Eurobarometer data



'For EU enlargement' 2001/2004 - 2008 – Standard Eurobarometer data











APPENDIX B

'For EU enlargement' 2009 – 2019 – Standard Eurobarometer data





'For EU enlargement' 2009 – 2019 – Standard Eurobarometer data





'For EU enlargement' 2009 – 2019 – Standard Eurobarometer data



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