

**An evaluation of Iraq's Anti-Terrorism Law  
and its implementation (1)**

Az iraki terrorizmusellenes törvény és annak  
végrehajtásának értékelése (1)

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**Abstract:** This two-part analysis looks at Iraq's Anti-Terrorism Law and how it is used in the trials of suspected members of the Islamic State (IS), identifying potential issues with the law and its application. The author concludes that the Iraqi government is unlikely to achieve stability without significant changes that address the shortcomings of this law. The paper will first assess the law itself to determine the most problematic aspects, showing how these specific shortcomings violate human rights, benefit the majority at the cost of the minority, and allow for the continuation of corrupt government dealings.

**Összefoglaló:** A kétrészes elemzés az iraki terrorizmus-ellenes törvényt és annak szerepét mutatja be az Iszlám Állam feltételezett tagjaihoz kötődő büntetőügyekben, valamint azonosítja a jogszabállyal és annak gyakorlati alkalmazásával kapcsolatos aggályokat. A szerző fő következtetése szerint az iraki kormány nehezen tud stabilitást elérni a törvénnyel kapcsolatos hiányosságok orvoslására irányuló változtatások nélkül. Az elemzés először a törvényt magát ismerteti a legfontosabb problémáinak meghatározása érdekében, beleértve az olyan elemeket, amelyek emberi jogsértéseket tesznek lehetővé, a többséget erősítik a kisebbséggel szemben, és fenntartják a korrupt kormányzati gyakorlatot.

## INTRODUCTION

Iraq's broadly defined Anti-Terrorism Law has been used indiscriminately to arrest, detain, try, and sentence any person suspected of involvement with or loyalty to a terrorist organization, particularly the Islamic State (IS). Having been subject to criticism from both foreign powers and non-governmental organizations since its enactment in 2005, controversies surrounding this law have become paramount as thousands of suspected IS members are awaiting trial. Iraq now faces the seemingly impossible task of pursuing justice for the vast devastation wrought by IS while effectively trying to rebuild the state from within.

Criticisms focus on both the written law and the manner of its application; however, no capable state or international organization has taken steps beyond public condemnation to ensure that the standards of international law and human rights are upheld.

Certain groups affiliated with the Popular Mobilisation Forces (PMF) in Iraq have gone as far as criticize the [current judicial process as too lenient](#), arguing that death sentences must be carried out more quickly. Additionally, these groups have alleged some suspects have been [granted unwarranted release](#) thanks to corrupt dealings by certain judicial and law enforcement officials. This lack of trust plagues the legitimacy of Iraqi institutions at various levels, and it is regarded as the driving force behind some Iraqi soldiers in Mosul [carrying out extrajudicial executions](#) of their own accord.

The aim of this analysis is to assess both the language and the application of Iraq's Anti-Terrorism law pertaining to the trials of suspected IS members. First, I will break down the different articles of the law and show the ambiguities of its

language. After that I will examine five problems with the law itself, as well as five problems with the application of the law that are especially controversial. I will conclude by explaining how the issues with the law and how it is being applied, unchanged, will guarantee the perpetuation of problems that have long afflicted Iraq, including sectarian divides, governmental corruption, and curtailed human rights.

## THE ANTI-TERRORISM LAW

The sweeping Anti-Terrorism Law has become the cornerstone of conduct for the Iraqi government's pursuit of trial and punishment for any suspected affiliation with the Islamic State. In an effort to achieve post-conflict peace and stability, suspects who pledged allegiance to the group either willingly or under duress, played support roles such as providing medical aid or meals to fighters, or merely lived in an area occupied by IS have been legally deemed [categorically indifferent than and equally culpable as](#) the die-hard jihadists who fought on behalf of the group and its ideology.

All individuals are charged under the Iraqi Anti-Terrorism Law, issued on 7 November, 2005, Article 1 of which [defines terrorism](#) as the following:

*“Every criminal act committed by an individual or an organized group that targeted an individual or a group of individuals or groups of official or unofficial institutions and caused damage to public or private properties, with the aim to disturb the peace, stability, and national unity or to bring about horror and fear among people and to create chaos and achieve terrorist goals.”*

[Articles 2 and 3](#) identify broad categories of behaviour, participation, and affiliation classified as terrorism, as well as definitions of acts considered crimes against state security. [Article 4](#) provides two specific penalties for anyone found guilty: life imprisonment or death. In recent years, Article 4 of the Anti-Terrorism Law has become one of the most [commonly and widely applied](#) articles in the entirety of the Iraqi judicial system.

[Article 5](#), which mentions waiver of punishment, is only granted if information that contributes to the arrest of a criminal or is able to prevent the implementation of a terrorist act is reported to competent authorities. Extenuating legal circumstances, which, at best, can commute the death penalty to life imprisonment, are rarely presented in trial. The Amnesty law of 2016 and its 2017 amendment [eliminate any possibilities](#) wherein members of IS can be pardoned. [Article 6](#) sums up the final provisions and states that the country's Penal Law is to be applied in all situations not stipulated by this law.

One of the biggest challenges in pursuing justice in Iraq stems from the question of how and when to bring terrorists and foreign fighters to justice. The plethora of individuals facing terrorism charges, combined with the limited time and



resources available for prosecution, have [emerged as the primary justification](#) for the law's widespread application.

This law has attracted a wide range of criticism from various foreign governments and organizations, both for its textual flaws and its problematic application.

[The justifications](#) at the end of the law provided by the signatories in 2005 – then-president Jalal Talabani, vice president Adil Abdul Mahdi, and vice president Ghazi Ojail Yawir – were as follows:

*“The size and volume of damages resulting from the terrorists’ operations has reached a level that threatens to national unity, order, security and stability. To move forward towards a federal, pluralistic, democratic system based on the rule of law and the guarantee of rights and liberties and to set off in motion the wheel of comprehensive development, it has thus become necessary to issue a legislation that puts an end to and limits terrorist operations and reduces the interaction between those who execute them and those who support them.”*

## CRITICISM OF THE LAW

Many [reports](#) – conducted primarily by international non-governmental organizations (NGOs), UN organizations, and state agencies – reveal that Iraq [consistently fails](#) to meet both international and domestic legal obligations in carrying out the functions of its criminal justice system.

Criticism is directed both towards the law itself and its application. [Specifically, the law](#) (1) violates the requirement under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the Arab Charter on Human Rights that criminal laws must be precise and unambiguous; (2) appears to criminalize freedom of expression, association, and assembly without any narrow restrictions that would serve a legitimate State interest in preventing terrorism; (3) creates a serious risk of arbitrary detention, violating international law; (4) imposes the death penalty for all activities deemed acts of terrorism, without considering severity or individual level of involvement, constituting an arbitrary deprivation of life.

Specific areas of concern have been identified in various reports and statements. The [Human Rights Watch](#) (HRW) has stated that, until the Iraqi criminal justice system meets the fundamental standards of due process and fair trial, authorities create and implement a national strategy prioritizing the persecution of the most serious crimes, and laws are passed to criminalize war crimes and crimes against humanity, there will be no judicial documentation of crimes committed, nor justice for the victims of the Islamic State.

[Critics worry](#) that these counterterrorism charges are implicating many innocent bystanders and family members, sentencing thousands to death as part of a systemic emphasis on retribution over seeking justice. The office for the United Nations (UN) High Commissioner for Human Rights [warned last year](#) that any flaws in the judicial process would almost inevitably lead to ‘irreversible miscarriages’

of justice. This indicates that the highest international authorities are concerned about whether the Iraqi criminal justice system has the ability and the capacity to effectively and fairly try those accused of involvement with IS.

## PROBLEMS WITH THE LAW ITSELF

The most outspoken criticism regarding the written law can be summarized in five main points.

(1) *The law allows for arbitrary detention* by stipulating that all terror-related arrests can be conducted [without a warrant](#). The standard of incriminating information used to identify ISIS suspects is weak, based either on government “[wanted lists](#)”, which name suspected ISIS affiliates, or accusations by community members. As these lists and/or accusations are typically vague and lack any standard of evidence, there is [substantial risk](#) of the misidentification and subsequent detention of an innocent individual.

Many of those listed were never involved with the group, but they were [deemed suspect](#) either due to the involvement of a family member or accusations by community members who named people exclusively to avenge personal or local grievances. Individuals have reportedly been detained based solely on certain [demographic traits](#), such as being a ‘fighting-age’ male, or spatial proximity to areas previously held by IS. Those who did not instantly flee land occupied by IS and remained there until the area was recaptured by the state are typically [perceived as suspicious](#) by state security groups and allied armed forces, thus they face high rates of arrest.

Additionally, lack of communication between Iraqi and KRG officials has led to the [re-arrests](#) of individuals named on “wanted lists” who have been cleared in one jurisdiction but travel to another, as the authorities do not regularly communicate or update their databases. This [directly violates](#) the UN ICCPR, as an individual cannot be tried for the same offense in a country where they have already been deemed innocent.

Those arrested are [rarely made aware of the reasons for their arrest](#) and can be held for lengthy periods before facing trial, due to a lack of resources and capacity, as well as political corruption. Failing to inform an individual of the reasons for their arrest and detention is [outlawed in the UN ICCPR](#). Iraqi law holds that any individual facing trial for any law punishable by death can [be legally detained](#) for as long as the judicial process takes.

(2) *Failing to account for individual role*: classifying all individuals suspected of affiliation with IS as a conglomerate of equally culpable actors means that critical extenuating circumstances will be neither heard nor considered. The overbroad wording of the law has led judges and prosecutors to [criminalize membership](#) in itself, regardless of whether or not the individual partook in any violent, criminal, or terror-inducing acts. Additionally, at present, the law [does not distinguish](#) between those who actively sought to join ISIS due to shared beliefs and support for the goals of the group and those who became involved through more trivial means.



Armed militants who engaged in violent acts of warfare were far outnumbered by individuals who played non-violent support roles. However, those suspected of playing non-violent support roles – many of whom suffered substantially while living under the authority of the group, both physically and psychologically – are presently deemed legally indifferent and equally culpable for the devastation inflicted by the group.

While official estimates hold that Mosul was defended by 3,000-5,000 ISIS fighters, the names of [over 100,000 suspects](#) were circulated on government “wanted lists,” and thousands have been arrested, tried, and/or sentenced. This discrepancy should be alarming, as it contextualizes how wide the state is casting the punishment net in order to exert its authority in the pursuit of justice. By failing to narrow the law and focus on locating and trying the most devout jihadists, the state is ultimately jeopardizing the safety and security of its populus.

(3) *The law allows for the infringement of due process:* specialized counterterrorism courts utilize summary judicial processes to expedite trials by allowing for a [significantly lower standard of evidence](#) than is necessary to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. This legally allows judges to determine the guilt of a defendant based [exclusively on an admission of affiliation](#) with ISIS, typically presented in the form of a signed, thumb-printed confession. Defendants typically say they were [coerced](#) through torture, blindfolded when the thumbprints were taken, or asked to fingerprint a blank piece of paper that authorities later wrote a confession on. Additionally, as mentioned above, many defendants are never made explicitly aware of the charges against them, which violates due process in itself.

Reliance upon such trivial forms of evidence virtually invites malpractice and abuse to occur, as it effectively eliminates the defendant’s right to a fair trial, wherein they must be found guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. This further highlights the governmental emphasis on boasting a higher quantity of convictions at the expense of ensuring quality, legitimate trials focused on uncovering the truth of what occurred and at the hands of whom.

Finally, the impartiality of judges and prosecutors is critical to the standard of a fair trial. However, as most suspects are held and tried in areas that endured victimization by IS, concerns questioning the ability of these [authorities to remain impartial](#) have been raised.

(4) *Failing to protect juveniles:* Children who suffered immensely under the reign of ISIS are being tried under the Anti-Terrorism law, which [does not differentiate the role and culpability](#) of children versus adults. While the Iraqi Penal Code prohibits juveniles from receiving the death penalty, the government apparently [decided to overlook this prohibition](#) and has thus far determined on a case-by-case basis whether or not a minor can be sentenced to death. Minors are [entitled to certain protections](#) and considerations due to their age according to international law, and Iraq is failing to ensure these.

[Children became associated](#) with the group through various pathways, and they were exposed to ideological brainwashing, propaganda, violence, and the strict imposition of conservative Sharia law. They were made [front-line fighters and suicide](#)

[bombers](#), taught to build and plant explosives, conducted patrols, were employed as guards and spies, and they fulfilled various [support roles](#). Many children were forced to witness or participate in the [executions of prisoners](#). Estimates hold that at least a third of those who lived under the rule of the Islamic State are [younger than 15 years of age](#), yet there remains no legal discernment between minors and adults.

International law stipulates that the [recruitment or use of children](#) by violent, non-state groups is forbidden, and it contends that the affected children are predominantly victims who deserve support in order to achieve rehabilitation and societal reintegration. Experts collectively agree that the children of the caliphate [endured extreme levels of trauma](#) as their malleable young minds experienced everything from the devastation of war to inexplicable acts of violence and cruelty.

According to information compiled by various sources, the HRW estimated at the end of 2018 that the Iraqi and KRG authorities have [arrested and detained thousands of youth](#) on suspicion of IS membership. Multi-country research indicates that [ideology is seldom the motive](#) behind youth involvement with violent extremist groups, making them inherently less dangerous, and therefore less culpable and deserving of punishment, than those propagating and wholeheartedly believing in the cause and mission of the group.

(5) *The law allows for excessive use of the death penalty:* Iraq's extensive use of the death penalty is arguably the most commonly criticised aspect of both this law and Iraq's justice system. Foreign actors and organizations are extremely concerned about how frequently individuals are sentenced to death, as [98% of terrorism trials in Iraq result in guilty verdicts](#), and most of those found guilty are [sentenced to death](#). In the summer of 2018, the Iraqi government [executed every IS convict on death row](#). Additionally, intellectually disabled and physically incapacitated individuals have also been sentenced to death, [violating international law](#).

While the death penalty is not to be applied unless justices believe with 100 per cent certainty that the individual [poses a threat to Iraqi society](#), the judge's ability to objectively assess threat perceptions is very likely to be inextricably linked to their experiences with the group and the state-wide emphasis on punishment. An Iraqi Ministry of Justice spokesperson cited intense public pressure on judicial authorities to [seek justice and get results](#), which he argued should be focused on the rights of victims and their families instead of human rights.

IS inflicted such devastating harm upon Iraq that the country sees their [desire for vengeance as wholly justifiable](#). The country's Shia majority has largely blamed the Sunni minority for the insurgency, exacerbating sectarian divisions and [fueling retributive sentiment](#). In interviews, some judges expressed their belief that convicting all members and [inflicting extreme punishment is the only option](#). A senior Iraqi judge defended the criminalization of membership in saying that "[Terrorism is not just about the act of killing people](#); it is also an extremist ideology. Sometimes, unarmed members of terrorist groups are even more dangerous than those who carry weapons." In Mosul, another judge expressed his opinion that extreme beliefs must be met with extreme punishment, saying that "Daesh's ideology is so dangerous that we [cannot afford to show any leniency](#) even for those who were only





believers and did not commit specific crimes.” Again, this emphasis on retribution means that a determination of conclusive guilt is far less important than [reporting high rates of executions](#) and/or the imprisonment of fighters.

## PROBLEMS WITH THE APPLICATION OF THE LAW

Legal ambiguities and the nationwide thirst for retribution have created an environment conducive to procedural abuses and a disregard for human rights. Criticism of the application of the law can be divided into five main issues.

(1) *The conditions of detention:* The massive roundup of potential suspects awaiting trial has led to severe overcrowding, and the [conditions of detention have been described as inhuman](#). Lack of basic health and sanitary services in combination with excessively close quarters has caused [scabies outbreaks and sickness](#). Suspects are known to have [died in custody](#), but questions concerning how, why, how many, and even who, are unlikely to be answered.

[Iraqi law guarantees](#) that detainees will be brought before a judge within 24 hours of their arrest, will have access to a lawyer throughout the interrogation process, and their relatives will be notified of their detention, allowing for communication between the family and the suspect. These guarantees [align with international guidelines](#) outlined in the ICCPR and are necessary in ensuring that the rights of the defendant are upheld. However, Iraqi law holds that anyone facing charges for a crime punishable by death will be detained for as long as the judicial process takes, effectively nullifying the 24-hour guarantee. Additionally, [Iraqi lawyers interviewed](#) have said that most individuals facing trial under the Anti-Terrorism Law are not given access to legal representation, cannot communicate with family, and they are regularly subject to maltreatment and torture.

(2) *The use of torture:* Many suspects claim that they were [tortured throughout their interrogations](#) by security officials who aimed to obtain admissions of guilt and/or attempted to extract information from them. While pre-trial investigations are the responsibility of the police and the judiciary, the [military has inserted itself](#) into these investigations, violating the rights of suspects. This involvement threatens the separation of powers, creating what some affected Iraqis have dubbed a system of “[army justice](#).” [Torture and abuse](#) are more likely to occur at the hands of military investigators than those of civilian judicial investigators.

Failure to investigate these allegations indicates that authorities are indifferent at best and encouraging at worst, and it points towards abuses of the legal apparatus. Extra-judicial violence occurs not only in detention facilities but within the communities as well. Various people perceived as suspicious or thought to have been involved with IS have been [executed in their communities](#) by other members of the Iraqi society. That in itself is problematic. Employing torturous violence to achieve a desired outcome or political means exemplifies the impunity of those committing wrong within the system unto those suspected of doing wrong in society.

A 2015 report by the [UN Committee Against Torture](#) found that individuals suspected of terrorism, including children, had endured warrantless arrests, were deprived of opportunities to communicate with the outside world while detained, and they were severely tortured in order to obtain guilty confessions. A judge in the northern Iraqi city of Nineveh admitted to HRW that “many” suspects reported having been tortured, but a preceding study by HRW found that Iraqi judges typically [disregard these allegations when made by IS suspects](#).

This is yet another outcome of the state focus on reporting vast successes in seeking justice against the group. It indicates additional areas in which this behaviour disregards human rights, the standard of innocence, and protection against the law and the state.

(3) *Corruption influences legal outcomes:* Corruption in Iraq is so extensive that one’s ability to leverage this factor to their benefit can determine whether or not they even face trial. As a result, citizens largely do not trust the government or governmental institutions, and individuals working within the government or its official apparatus do not trust one another. Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) ranks countries based on expert assessments and opinion-based surveys concerning levels of public sector corruption. In 2018, the CPI ranked Iraq as the [168th most corrupt of the 180](#) countries surveyed.

Corruption in the detention process is so pervasive that [rich, hardcore jihadis can buy their way out of prison](#). Official estimates state that IS has [between \\$50 million and \\$300 million](#) in cash. That amount of capital makes taking advantage of the corruption within the government easy, and it [exacerbates distrust](#) in the Iraqi judicial apparatus. This creates a very real potential for the [most dangerous and loyal fighters to be freed](#), while poor individuals who had little to no involvement with the group face execution.

A senior Iraqi intelligence official involved in counterterrorism operations has admitted that he is sometimes present when his subordinates [murder detainees in extra-judicial fashion](#). When he and his subordinates know the prisoner is a hardcore jihadist, he explained, they may choose to [kill them in order to prevent their paid release](#) and face the potential of fighting them in the future. Corruption affects the integrity of some authorities, and this lack of trust between officials working toward the same goal has led to individuals taking the law into their own hands. This is yet another reason the populus lacks faith in its governance and the integrity of state institutions.

(4) *The treatment of women* caused immeasurably suffering throughout the reign of IS, and thousands of women continue to suffer in the aftermath of this insurgency. Those who were [married to IS members or were associated with the group](#) are living in internally displaced persons (IDP) camps, lacking rights due to their status as a woman and/or widow, are unable to return home, have no form of identification, which would be necessary to access state services and educate their children, and they face sexual violence by guards and other prisoners. [Association with IS typically began](#) when women were either tricked



into joining the insurgency or were unable to leave their husbands when they joined the group, as their own safety and financial security and oftentimes that of their children was wholly dependent on the men.

[Women captured by IS](#) endured rape, sexual assault, and sexual slavery, were forcibly married to members of Daesh, and were used for labour. Enduring this type of unrelenting abuse inflicts a substantial amount of trauma, and perpetrators deserve to have appropriate charges brought against them. Instead, many of these women are being tried for involvement with the group, and the state has thus delivered heavy-handed justice to them. Men who are known to have committed acts of rape and/or sexual enslavement have not had any such charges brought against them, and instead [only face charges of terrorism](#). Ignoring this knowledge and failing to try individuals identified as having carried out these crimes not only sets a standard of indifference, but it also poses a threat to women everywhere.

Living in a patriarchal society means women generally lack the freedom to make their own choices and move freely. These abilities are known to be [further diminished during times of war](#). Unfortunately, these factors have been entirely disregarded. Instead, the state has chosen to utilize its capacity to punish women to the full extent of the law, sending a clear message that the [culpability of these women is irrelevant](#), and their defence does not matter.

(5) *Exacerbating social and sectarian divisions*: On top of the post-conflict disarray ailing Iraqi society, the effects of highly fragmented political groups, rampant sectarian division, many displaced citizens, and the second-class treatment of minorities have exacerbated already [dangerously intense societal divisions](#).

Extremist groups like IS [capitalize on emergence opportunities](#) resulting from governmental failures to provide basic services to its people while also ignoring the need to maintain cooperation and coordination between the state, society, and local communities. [Sectarian attitudes](#) held by some politicians in Baghdad account for a majority of these failures. Disparate economic and social problems emerging as a direct outcome of sectarian politics have compounded the omnipresent conflict and created the foundation for the [political influence of IS to exist and remain intact](#).

[Stigmatization and alienation](#) afflict Sunnis who were associated with IS through membership, familial ties, or merely by having lived in a territory controlled by the insurgency. [The marginalization](#) of Sunni Muslims was the key reason why so many individuals chose to pledge their allegiance to IS in the first place. Sunnis are being treated indiscriminately as supporters of IS, and many who are finally returning to their hometowns are faced with [inescapable suspicion and isolation](#). While marginalization from outside groups is harming reintegration efforts, within the Sunni Arab community itself there is an abundance of [distrust and fear](#), as the IS ideology and militant cells persist.

Most individuals facing charges for association with Daesh are Sunni. The state emphasis on retribution constitutes the most profound threat in this regard for a variety of reasons. The inherently sectarian nature of IS and these trials has caused defamation and further alienating the Sunni minority, [causing enmity](#)

instead of engaging the citizenry in unification efforts. Many Sunnis who once lived in areas occupied by IS [especially fear returning home](#) – government officials have even recommended the relocation of many of these people – as non-Sunni Iraqis in these areas view them with suspicion and even hostility. These sentiments have already led to horrific acts of inhumanity amongst citizens, including [extrajudicial executions](#), as previously mentioned. Treating a broad sector of society as suspect [creates an opportunity for new surges of outrage](#) to emerge among local communities against the state.

These social and sectarian divisions pose an existential threat to a peaceful Iraq. Jihadists have repeatedly engaged in efforts to [foment a sectarian war](#) between the Sunni and Shia populations of Iraq. They view the [spreading of sectarian violence](#) as a way to undermine the government, while also acting in ways that manifest their hate for Shia Islam. The insurgency has coalesced around both [Iraqi nationalism and Islamic extremism](#), waging a war of ideology. The Iraqi state repeatedly fails to look within and address the core problems of sectarian and societal divisions. It is this disregard that is inhibiting state unification and has allowed the country to remain unstable for so long.

## CONCLUSION

The ambiguities of the Anti-Terrorism law and the manner of its application are highly concerning and inherently problematic. When combined with the extensive corruption plaguing state institutions and the governmental belief that the need for retribution outweighs human rights, it must be concluded that this approach is fundamentally incapable of delivering justice, providing a mechanism of stability, and ultimately preventing any future insurgency effort. In order to prevent future miscarriages of justice, both the ambiguously broad language of the law and the expectations surrounding its application and purpose must be clarified. Because of the fact that many members of the Shia majority feel strongly about punishing those involved with IS to the full extent of the law, it is reasonable to conclude that the state will not receive public pressure substantial enough to trigger the necessary changes. Many foreign governments and NGOs are heavily involved in efforts to rebuild and restabilize Iraq, and they have a responsibility to raise these concerns and ensure that they are addressed. Initially, various countries were hesitant to contribute funds to Iraq, since the state is notoriously corrupt, and that corruption in itself is a highly destabilizing factor. If these states wish to protect their investment in a peaceful Iraq, it is imperative that they push back against this law and its use and demand legal amendments, institutional reform, and oversight free from the grips of corruption.

After a group like IS was able to elicit and consolidate enough support to amass the power it did, it is necessary for the state to look at the factors which had led to its rise and address those issues comprehensively. The authorities in



Iraq have thus far neglected to engage in any retrospective analysis capable of informing their approach to justice, and they continually reject criticism, despite the growing amount of information that unequivocally shows that their approach previously provided an insurgency-friendly environment and will do so again in the future.

In order to establish a system of justice that is deemed fair and impartial – a necessary pillar of stability in a country that needs this desperately – the law needs amending, and the expectations of the legal system, its goals, and the goals of those who work within it need clarifying. Additionally, in order to avoid a resurgence of IS or a similar insurgency, the sectarian issues which created a division IS capitalized on must be addressed.