1. The EU is politicizing its own enlargement process.
Every year, the European Commission publishes country reports on EU candidate countries (Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, North Macedonia, Moldova, Montenegro, Serbia, Türkiye and Ukraine) and potential candidate countries (Georgia and Kosovo). In contrast to Ukraine and Moldova, where a geopolitical decision has been made, it appears that Western Balkan countries must still rigorously adhere to the Copenhagen criteria. Enlargement decisions are made by the member states (the European Council), and each new country must obtain unanimous approval to join the EU and even make advancements in their respective integration process. After all, it’s all about politics, not technical requirements. Technicalities can be essential to a degree if the political desire is present. Without real negotiations, however, the political elites of the accession countries simply do not pay too much attention to the European Commission’s reports.
2. Last week, the European Commission recommended opening accession negotiations with Ukraine and Moldova.
After the decision on Ukraine’s and Moldova’s accession talks, the EU lost a lot of credibility in the Western Balkan countries. Curiously, the institutions themselves, not the member states, politicized the enlargement process. Hungary strongly opposes any double standards in relation to Western Balkan countries and other (possible) applicants. Due to a lack of political unity among member states—and candidates’ refusal to work for the new aims and fulfill the “old-new” conditions—there is little chance for a rapid procedure. There is still some fuel in the Spanish-Belgian-Hungarian presidency trio’s engine, but it is unclear what will happen after the 2024 European parliamentary elections. It is encouraging to see the European Commission supporting enlargement by providing technical and financial help to candidates and potential candidate countries, and trying to seek out possible ways to speed up the enlargement process, but the major decisions will still be made on the intergovernmental level. Most of the member states look at the problem as a geopolitical necessity and want to keep close those countries located in our neighborhood.
3. While Western Balkan countries are subject to strict Copenhagen criteria, it seems that political considerations are driving the accession of Ukraine and Moldova.
Till the beginning of the Russo-Ukrainian war, the lack of political will for EU expansion was even more pronounced in Ukraine and Moldova than it was with respect to the Western Balkans. After the commencement of the Russo-Ukrainian war, the area once characterized as a “buffer zone” between East and West gained significant geostrategic importance. As a result, the EU aimed to send a strong statement to the international community, and to Ukraine and Moldova, that they were within its area of influence and that it accepted responsibility for them. This obligation, however, is more than just an external reinforcement of Ukraine and Moldova’s Western orientation: it also represents the EU’s readiness to act in the future, should U.S. engagement in European affairs be significantly reduced. Nonetheless, it should be highlighted that the current decision—beyond its political implications—does not necessarily represent a major leap forward in the accession process. The negotiation of the chapters of the acquis could take decades, as we have seen in the case of the Western Balkans or Türkiye.
4. The Western Balkan states are essential for a strong Europe.
Because of their small population sizes and the significant reform efforts they have made in recent decades, all six Western Balkan countries, looking at the technical criteria only, are better prepared to join to EU than the rest of the candidate countries. Despite this, in four of the countries, there has been no significant change, neither positive nor negative. According to the European Commission’s findings, however, Serbia has not made a meaningful step toward EU admission in recent years. Serbia’s silent suspension of the admission process is remarkably similar to what happened in Türkiye. Opening accession negotiations with Bosnia and Herzegovina would also be essential to give a fresh impetus to internal reforms and thus reduce security-related concerns in the country. Advancing further on the enlargement paths of Albania, North Macedonia and Montenegro would create healthy competition among candidate countries and possibly put governments under pressure to go through with internal reforms. Finally, granting candidate status to Kosovo, although mainly a symbolic gesture, would signal the EU’s willingness towards the country’s European path too.
5. Hungary strongly supports the Western Balkans’ accession and is organizing a national consultation regarding Ukraine’s.
Hungary supports the idea of regional integration and is committed to achieving results as quickly as possible. It is necessary due to the volatile geopolitical climate, economic prospects and our shared historical legacy. Ukraine may be at a crossroads because it has decided to join Europe, but it is up to us, the Europeans, to reach an agreement on this historic decision. As we, like all European countries, believe in democratic values, the Hungarian government is not afraid to consult the people and listen to their opinions on this issue. A National Consultation on Ukraine’s accession to the EU is therefore planned for 2024. Budapest wants a rich, democratic, and stable neighborhood that includes all six countries of the Western Balkan countries as well as other candidate countries. For us, the EU means the protection of national minorities, mutual respect for our sovereign governments and cooperation in building a healthy market economy that can easily benefit from new members in the years to come.
Written by the fellows of HIIA